By Ezinwanne Onwuka
Farmers, traders, and fishermen now need permits to move, fish, and trade across the Lake Chad. But these are not government documents from Abuja. They are tax tickets issued by the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP).
In that fragile border zone where Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon meet, ISWAP has built a shadow state. It collects revenue, regulates trade, enforces compliance, and punishes defaulters. The group exercises near-total control over the region’s natural resources.
From Destruction to Administration
Lake Chad was once one of Africa’s richest freshwater ecosystems. It fed millions through fishing, farming, and cross-border trade. But decades of drought, climate change, and mismanagement have shrunk the lake by nearly 90 percent.
This environmental crisis has provided fertile ground for extremist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP, which exploit local grievances to expand recruitment and territorial influence.
Boko Haram launched its insurgency in northeast Nigeria in 2009, but it split in 2016. The other faction rebranded as ISWAP and pledged loyalty to the Islamic State.
Unlike its parent group, ISWAP shifted strategy. It combined insurgency with a governance and tax system in rural zones that has enabled it to withstand sustained military pressure.
“ISWAP is no longer just a militant group,” Yakubu Ojochogwu, a conflict researcher based in Abuja, told TruthNigeria. “It has evolved into a parallel government. What began as an insurgency has quietly matured into an economic system.”
ISWAP has since become the most active and lethal of all ISIS affiliates.
The Mechanics of Terror Taxes
ISWAP operates an organized system of taxation in three categories.
The first is haraji, paid by non-residents who enter ISWAP territory for economic activity. Fishermen, traders, and farmers must pay to access land or water.
Zakat applies to livestock owners while Darayib are arbitrary fees imposed at the group’s discretion to raise extra cash.
With these taxes, ISWAP earns an estimated $191 million annually — more than Borno State’s 2024 internally generated revenue of $18.4 million.
“That money sustains everything: weapons purchases, recruitment, transportation, intelligence, and even bribes,” Ojochogwu said. “It keeps the system running.”
ISWAP’s Fishing Tax Empire
Entry into ISWAP-controlled territories is a licensed privilege. The New Humanitarian details how the system operates.
Before entering, every person must pay a $13 entry fee. Those with cash pay immediately at the first checkpoint. Those without are allowed in only after pledging to pay later, with group leaders guaranteeing the settlement of the debt.
Fishing generates the largest share of ISWAP’s revenue. In a single fishing season, the group can earn about $156,000 from entry permits alone.
Fishermen must also pay to be assigned fishing zones. Fees range from $13 to $196 per season (usually from February to June), depending on location and fishing method.
ISWAP’s fishers’ association boasts of about 15,000 members across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Around 10,000 are large-scale operators, each harvesting between 2,000 and 5,000 cartons in a good season. The fishing tax per carton varies, but the average levy is around $2.60 per 100-kilogram carton.
The Tax Network Beyond Lake Chad
The ‘success’ of ISWAP’s administrative model has created a dark blueprint for other armed groups. What began as a structured system in the Lake Chad basin is now being mirrored by the loosely organized bandits of the Northwest.
These armed groups are pivoting from hit-and-run kidnappings to their own form of territorial taxation.
In parts of Kano and Katsina states, bandits now impose farm levies on sugarcane growers.
Nigerian media reports say the bandits operate from Rugu Forest in Katsina and Falgore Forest in Kano, where they collect farm taxes and threaten non-compliant farmers.
Farmers are forced to pay up to $33 per acre just to begin their harvest. Those who refuse face destroyed crops, kidnappings, or death.
The pattern is consistent across northern Nigeria, especially in Zamfara, Katsina, parts of Sokoto, and Niger states, where armed Fulani terrorist groups have entrenched themselves in vast rural and forested regions.
Security analyst Zagazola Makama warns that the system will endure as long as money continues to flow. “This is not ideology-driven violence at its core,” Zagazola said. “It is a cash-flow-driven criminality. Every payment funds the next attack.”
Ezinwanne Onwuka writes special features for TruthNigeria.
