Are Size and Lethality of Current Army on the Right Track?
By Onibiyo Segun
(Mafa, Borno state) The Nigerian military took credit for repelling a complex attack involving both Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa in four districts of Borno State in the early hours of Oct. 23, according to Reuters. Spokesmen said more than 50 terrorists were killed, including 5 Boko Haram subcommanders.
Both civilians and military in four Borno communities – Mafa, Dikwa, Marte, and Ajiri – were hit simultaneously.
The ISIS-allied insurgents stormed late Wednesday, October 22, into Mafa, riding more than a hundred motorcycles and four gun trucks, according to witnesses.
“At about 11:40 p.m., they looted goods from commuters parked at a gate near a military checkpoint, burning vehicles before turning on a nearby barracks,” eyewitness Abubakar Dawhu told TruthNigeria,
Simultaneous strikes erupted in Dikwa, Marte, and Ajiri, with locals reporting heavy gunfire and insurgent movement across those zones, according to reports.
A military spokesman confirmed the attacks struck between midnight and 4 a.m., targeting forward troop positions.
Troops responded with both ground force and air support, repelling the militants and claiming to have neutralized over 50 fighters. Recovered arms included AK-47s, RPG tubes, machine guns, and rounds of ammunition, according to Nigerian media.
But even as the military frames this as a victory, the fierce assault raises questions about the efficacy of the Nigerian government’s 16-year battle with tens of thousands of heavily armed jihadist insurgents.
Have Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Healed their Rift?
Boko Haram and ISWAP have long fought each other, splitting in 2016 when Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) backed a Boko Haram breakaway faction under Abu Musab al-Barnawi, creating Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP). Since then, clashes and competition over territory, recruits, and loot have ensued.
Over time, ISWAP gradually eclipsed Boko Haram in many areas, absorbing splinter elements and marginalizing Shekau’s loyalists. In many frontline zones, remnant Boko Haram fighters now operate under ISWAP’s umbrella or in local alliances.
Military and counterterrorism analyst based in Abuja, Dr. Harry Iniette cautioned that the present “cooperation” is often tactical and situational – joint attacks where interests overlap, not a wholesale merger.
“Yet the coordinated assault seen this week suggests a new level of synergy, at least in certain fronts. For many, it marks a dangerous pivot: where once they fought each other, now they may fight as one against the state,” Iniette concluded.
Why, after 16 years, do the insurgents still hold ground?
When the Islamist insurgency began in 2009, bandit gangs in Zamfara, Niger, and the Middle Belt of Nigeria were marginal. Today they dominate broad swathes of northwestern Nigeria and threaten even southwest corridors.
Unlike ideologically driven jihadists, bandits primarily pursue profit via kidnappings, cattle rustling, gold mining, and ransom schemes. But over time, reports say they have forged loose tactical links with Islamist networks, gaining access to arms, logistics, and intelligence.
In Zamfara, communities have reported mass abductions, village burnings, and forced levies. In parts of Plateau, Benue, and Kaduna, attacks by armed gangs increasingly mirror jihadist methods, raids, arson, targeting civilians.
Retired wing commander Effiong Etuk, a military tactical commander said, “Firstly, geography works in their favor. Vast forest belts, remote areas, cross-border sanctuaries in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and porous borders give insurgents room to melt away or re-infiltrate.
“Secondly, they have co-opted local populations. Some communities accept militants as de facto governors – collecting ‘taxes,’ mediating disputes, offering protection or intimidation. This social rooting complicates military operations, since every village becomes a contested social space.
“Thirdly, the insurgents are operationally adaptive. They eschew mass formations, prefer small, agile cells, use drones, IEDs, decentralized command, and hybrid tactics that frustrate conventional forces,” he said.
Nigeria’s military, critics argue, is stretched thin. Security experts claim the army is only about half the size it should be to effectively dominate all insurgent fronts simultaneously.
Retired Colonel Hassan Donga told TruthNigeria, “Troops are overstretched, logistics difficult, intelligence uneven, and funding sometimes diverted or delayed.”
“Political and governance failures compound the problem. Displacement, poverty, weak local institutions, corruption in security spending, and limited state presence in rural areas leave gaps the insurgents exploit,” he added.
Terrorist Footprint Expanding
Security watchers warn that the insurgency’s footprint is expanding. The Middle Belt is now under pressure, and corridors toward the southwest are under threat of infiltration.
In Borno itself, analogous attacks have exploded in frequency. In March 2025, ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters launched coordinated assaults on two military bases in Borno, overrunning forward camps before air power intervened.
In 2025, militants also struck in Ngamdu (northeastern Borno), killing soldiers and damaging military vehicles via rockets, IEDs, drones, and ambushes along critical supply routes.
And more recently, militants abducted four in Kwakwahu, Adamawa State, including a mentally unstable man brutally stabbed during the raid, according to TruthNigeria.
In September 2025, TruthNigeria also documented an attack on the border town of Banki, where insurgents overran the barracks, forcing troops to flee and leaving the base in disarray.
These events show the insurgents’ reach is neither dormant nor localized, it strikes both military and civilian targets across zones.
The Attack in Mafa, Borno State
In Mafa, residents say the militants arrived quietly, masked, and in force. They looted foodstuffs, set ablaze vehicles, then turned on the nearby military base, pushing defenders back. Some villagers reported hearing automatic weapons and explosions deep into the night.
In Dikwa and Marte, older residents described men moving quietly from hamlet to hamlet, herding villagers out before shooting or torching structures. Some said militants warned them to move or perish.
One local source, Alhaji Dikwa said: “They told us this was their land now, either submit or go.”
A military source, speaking off the record, admitted that the strikes exposed gaps in base perimeter security, early warning, and local intelligence in all four communities.
Dr Hassan Donga, a terrorism analyst told TruthNigeria: “This latest coordinated onslaught signals a dangerous shift. If jihadist factions can reliably combine forces, Nigeria’s war becomes even more complex.
“The spreading menace of banditry and its blending with jihadist tactics means the conflict may no longer be confined to the northeast.
“Until Nigeria addresses the core deficits in force strength, intelligence capacity, logistics, and governance, it risks slippage, local defeats, and broader territorial erosion,” Donga concluded.
For now, the violence continues tightening its grip.
Onibiyo Segun reports on terrorism and conflicts for TruthNigeria
