By Mike Odeh James
Nigeria has sanctioned 48 individuals and entities accused of financing terrorism, but the list excludes any linked to Fulani Ethnic Militia networks, even as ongoing court cases raise fresh questions about accountability.
The Nigeria Sanctions Committee (NIGSAC), chaired by Lateef Fagbemi, the Attorney-General of the Federation, released the updated list under the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022. The law empowers the government to identify, freeze assets, and restrict the activities of individuals or groups suspected of supporting terrorism.
According to the committee, the sanctions target financial backers, logistics coordinators, couriers, and others who enable violent groups to operate.
The list includes individuals connected to three organizations already designated as terrorist groups by the Nigerian government: the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Ansaru, and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB).
Among those named is Kaduna-based publisher Tukur Mamu, who authorities accuse of acting as an intermediary in ransom negotiations during the 2022 Abuja-Kaduna train attack. Officials allege that more than $200,000 passed through channels linked to him in dealings with ISWAP.
The release of the sanctions list comes at a time of growing international pressure on Nigeria to demonstrate stronger action against Islamist terrorism by insurgencies and Fulani ethnic militia.
In 2025, the United States designated Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern over violations of religious freedom, a classification used for countries where the government is seen as tolerating or failing to address serious abuses.
More recently, the U.S. Embassy in Abuja cancelled visa appointments and directed non-emergency personnel to leave the country, citing worsening security conditions. In Washington, lawmakers have proposed new legislation, co-sponsored in the U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, titled the Nigeria Religious Freedom Accountability Act, which would tie future U.S. assistance to measurable progress in holding perpetrators and their sponsors accountable.
Despite these developments, the absence of any names linked to Fulani militia networks has drawn criticism from analysts and rights advocates. Over the past decade, communities across Nigeria’s Middle Belt – a region that separates the largely Muslim north from the predominantly Christian South – have suffered repeated attacks attributed by residents and local officials to armed groups of Fulani origin.
“This is a politically selective approach,” said David Onyilokwu Idah, Director of the Human Rights Commission in Abuja. “A sanctions list should reflect the full scope of the threat landscape, not just a portion of it.”
Fulani Ethnic Militia accounts for over 70 percent of the death of Christians in Nigeria, yet their financiers do not make the list, Idah noted.
A NIGSAC official familiar with the process said the committee relies on available intelligence and evidence that meets legal thresholds. The official added that additional names could be included as investigations progress.
Court Cases Raise Questions About Omitted Networks
Credit Facebook page of Myetti Allah.
While the sanctions list focuses on certain groups, a separate legal process is unfolding in Abuja that has intensified scrutiny of other actors.
At the Federal High Court, nine men are currently facing a 57-count terrorism charge linked to the June 13, 2025 attack on Yelewata, a community in Benue State. More than 200 people were reported killed in the incident, making it one of the deadliest episodes of violence in the region in recent years.
Among the defendants is Ardo Lawal Mohammed Dono, identified in court filings as the Nasarawa State chairman of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), a prominent organization representing Fulani cattle herders.
Prosecutors allege that Dono and others provided material and financial support for the attack. According to charges presented in court, this included mobilizing fighters, coordinating movements across state lines, and facilitating access to weapons. Police intelligence cited by the prosecution claims that planning meetings were held at Dono’s residence prior to the attack.
The defendants have not been convicted, and the case remains before the court.
Frank Utoo, a Yelewata indigene who lost 34 family members in the attack and works with Equipping the Persecuted, said he had previously encountered Dono during peace meetings organized by local authorities.
“It was clear to us that he had influence over the violence affecting our community,” Utoo told TruthNigeria. “When we asked for the killings to stop, the response we received suggested that it would continue.”
Utoo said the trial represents an important step but warned that past experiences have made affected communities cautious about expecting justice.
Adakole Adam, a security consultant based in Takum, also pointed to the broader implications of the case.
“When individuals in leadership positions are linked to violent incidents, it raises serious concerns about how these operations are organized and sustained,” he said.
Previous Cases Fuel Concerns Over Accountability
The current trial is not the first time a senior figure associated with a Fulani organization has faced legal action.
In January 2024, Bello Bodejo, national president of Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, was arrested after publicly launching a large vigilante group in Nasarawa State. Video footage of the event circulated widely at the time.
The federal government later withdrew the charges against him, citing insufficient evidence. The decision drew criticism from observers who argued that it undermined confidence in the justice process.
Such developments have contributed to what some analysts describe as a recurring pattern in high-profile cases: arrests are made, charges are filed, but cases do not always lead to convictions.
Whether the ongoing Yelewata case will follow a different path remains uncertain, but its outcome is likely to influence public perception of the government’s willingness to pursue accountability across all groups.
Gaps Between Policy and Enforcement
The absence of individuals linked to Fulani militia networks from the sanctions list, combined with ongoing prosecutions, has highlighted what observers describe as a gap between policy announcements and enforcement actions.
International organizations, including the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and advocacy groups such as Genocide Watch and Open Doors, have documented patterns of violence affecting communities in Nigeria’s Middle Belt. These reports often cite concerns about impunity and the limited number of prosecutions that result in convictions.
So far, there has been no public response from U.S. officials specifically addressing the omissions in Nigeria’s latest sanctions list.
Both MACBAN and Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore have consistently denied any involvement in violent activities, stating that they represent lawful and peaceful pastoralist interests.
However, proceedings in the Federal High Court — including testimony presented by law enforcement — continue to raise questions about how attacks are planned and financed.
As Nigeria seeks to demonstrate progress in addressing terrorism financing, the effectiveness and credibility of its sanctions regime may ultimately depend on whether it is seen as comprehensive, consistent, and free from political influence.
For communities affected by violence, the issue is not only who is named on a list, but whether the system delivers justice
Mike Odeh James is a conflict reporter with TruthNigeria.
